or as larger mental modals consisting of concepts and interrelations (Johnson-Laird 1983) . Furthermore, they not only consist of schematized representations of static referents but also include so-called scripts (Anderson 2007, 195) , which are schematized representations of a course of events-for example, visiting a restaurant.
In other words, in the semantic memory, which is part of the long-term memory, schematized representations of extralinguistic entities or referents are built. In addition to this storage of schematized declarative knowledge, Baddeley et al. propose an episodic memory that contains our personal experience and "underpins the capacity to remember specific single episodes or events" (2010, 11) . It is therefore often called autobiographic memory (Rickheit, Weiss, and Eikmeyer 2010, 36; Schwarz-Friesel 2008, 107) . The representations stored in both parts of the long-term memory are then recalled and instantiated in the actual communication situation.
Returning to the conceptualization of extralinguistic entities, Anderson proposes a conceptual hierarchy consisting of three levels (2007, 184) . recall of visual representations. Nevertheless, conceptualization on this level requires access to a concrete specimen on the lower level. In other words, the word bird would be visualized by the representation of a special or prototypical specimen of a bird, like a canary (rather than, say, a penguin).
The first level refers to the highest degree of abstraction. Mental imagery linked to the entries on this level requires the recall of concrete entries on the second and third levels. The next higher level would be the conceptual level of creature, which could only be conceptualized in verbal form and would require access to the visual and sensorial representations on the lower levels (see Griebel 2013, 25) . Regarding the concept attributes on the different levels, all attributes of the higher levels also apply for all concepts on the lower levels, whereas the conceptual attributes on the lowest levels are only valid for this specimen of the category.
One important issue-particularly with regard to the legal context-is the mental representation of abstract words without any concrete extralingustic referent. It is assumed that abstract concepts like religion, truth, or law are represented in the memory in the form of verbal structures (for details see Griebel 2013, 63-74) ; they are not immediately linked to a mental image and therefore have to be instantiated by activating a network of larger The authors describe their model as an integrative approach to language processing, combining both bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes.
This means the cognitive processing of an utterance is, on the one hand, driven by the utterance (i.e., the text actually read-bottom-up) and, on the other hand, by activating and instantiating knowledge about the extralinguistic world stored in the long-term memory (Rickheit, Sichelschmidt, and Strohner 2002 
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The utterance constitutes the bottom of the model. Concerning the processing of the utterance, Rickheit, Sichelschmidt, and Strohner (2002, 109) refer to the propositional model of text processing proposed by Kintsch and van Dijk (1978; . In their strictly bottom-up-driven approach, (Kintsch and van Dijk 1978) .
At the same time, the reader activates his knowledge about the extralinguistic world stored in his semantic memory (top-down processing) in order to facilitate comprehension and/or enrich text information by drawing inferences. Even before starting the reading process sensu stricto, presuppositions are formed about the intention of the sender (Rickheit and Strohner 1999; Sanford and Garrod 1998) , while at the same time a known text schema is activated that controls the comprehension process on a macrostructural level (see Kintsch and van Dijk 1978) . Whether bottom-up-or top-down-driven processes dominate the reception notably depends on how strongly the recipient himself is embedded in the communication situation (Rickheit, Weiss, and Eikmeyer 2010) , as well as how familiar he is with the subject of the text. In other words, the higher the degree of familiarity with the subject of the text and the communication situation, the more the recipient will be able to draw enriching inferences by activating his knowledge. The less the subject is known, the more the understanding of the text will depend on the processes at the micro-and macropropositional levels. Thus, it is evident how much the successful understanding of a text depends on the linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge of the reader and on successful inference processes. of the utmost importance in translation studies" (Simonnaes 2013, 150) .
From a cognitive point of view, this statement can also be inverted.
Understanding, in terms of activating memorized knowledge and building a mental model of the information given by the utterance, is a means of interpreting the communication situation in which the utterance is embedded, the situation set forth in the utterance, and, consequently, the extralinguistic world to which the utterance refers. How can the general approach presented in section 2.2 be applied to the comprehension of legal texts characterized by a high degree of complexity, specialization, and abstraction? We will illustrate the reception of legal texts with the following model of legal text comprehension ( Figure 3 ). In this adaption of the model by Rickheit, Sichelschmidt, and Strohner (2002) , the general components of the original will be differentiated in order to encompass all the issues of legal text understanding.
EXTRALINGUSTIC WORLD

Schematized conceptual representations of the world(s)
Holstic mental models/situation models of parts of the world(s) (episodic memory)
Mental models of particular facts and situations of the extralinguistic world(s) (semantic memory)
Textual knowledge (text schemas)
Mental lexicon: lexicalconceptual knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the concept's extralinguistic reality
Mental situation model (of the situation exposed in the text)
Propositional representation of the utterance
UTTERANCE/TEXT
Consisting of numerous partial worlds, including specialized worlds. Together, these worlds constitute the extralinguistic reality.
Refers to the extralinguistic world or to partial worlds, including specialized worlds) Returning to the top of the model, the extralinguistic world has to be described in more detail. In contrast to the general idea of extralinguistic by abstraction from and preparation of the reality, and that of the concrete extralinguistic reality, which underlies the constructed world of law. In order to reduce complexity, Figure 4 contains only parts of the general model presented in Figure 3 .
Inferences
Mental model of the extralegal situation to which the text refers explicitly or implicitly Schematized conceptual representations of the world(s)
Mental models of concrete facts and situations (semantic memory)
Extralinguistic world in country AB Extralinguistic world in country XY Schmatized mental models of legal facts -epistemic units which are parts of the legal knowledge frames encompassing legal terms and institutions (semantic memory) Mental lexicon: : lexical-conceptual knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the term's legal, extralegal and extralinguistic reality.
"Entrance" to the conceptual system. Contains the basic features of the term/word which allows the distinction between general and specialized language. Links the concept with the legal knowledge frames.
Mental model of the legal and institutional situation of the text As mentioned above, the legal world differs substantially from the real-life extralinguistic world, as it is a constructed world generally shaped by the linguistically fixed legal order that defines the rules for the actions of the individual subject to the law, social life, and functioning. Thus, while texts, as defined by Rickheit, Sichelschmidt, and Strohner (2002) , refer, in general, to extralinguistic facts in terms of a concrete, perceptible world, legal texts refer-at least partly, though often primarily-to a legal and legal-linguistic world, being only indirectly connected with extralinguistic referents. Therefore, when drawing inferences from semantic memory, those schematized conceptual representations are not only models of extralinguistic facts but, again, models of linguistically fixed, legally constructed facts that refer only secondly and indirectly to an extralinguistic world-an extralegal world (see Griebel 2013, 152-160) .
Hence, due to the high degree of abstraction of legal language and terminology, it is not surprising that memorization and recall of legal knowledge require high cognitive effort. We are only able to build stable and instantiable schematized models in long-term memory if those concepts are cross-linked to other concepts with concrete extralinguistic referents. In other words, the memorization also takes place on two levels in the extralinguistic world: the legal and legalized abstract world and, behind this abstract universe of law, the everyday reality that is covered and shaped by law. Abstraction is the result of the work of legal experts. Especially in the consists of the preparation of everyday reality in order to construct legally evaluable facts that can be subsumed under legal provisions. In the opposite case, the case of legislation, lawmakers strive for a high degree of abstraction and generalization in order to guarantee that a provision is applicable to the maximum number of real-life cases. In both cases, the recipient of the legal text, in our case the legal translator, must establish the link between the extralinguistic and extralegal world and the utterance of the legal expert. Often, nonexperts-including students in legal translation classes-discern the concrete, real-life situation only as a shadow behind the legal formulations.
Mental representation of legal lexis
Mental representation of legal terms and organization of declarative legal knowledge form part of the semantic memory (see Figure 3) . Regarding the abstract legal lexis, on which level do we have to place concepts like homicide, negligence, or offence in the conceptual hierarchy presented in A special form of networks or agglomerations of legal knowledge has been described by Busse (1992; 1999; , who calls them juristische Wissensrahmen-frames of legal knowledge. Busse defines these legal knowledge frames as structured complexes of concepts and intertextual relations relevant for comprehending a legal term (Busse 1992, 37) . Hence, before translating a legal term or phraseologism, the translator must comprehend the extension and the intension of the term, as well as the function the term fulfills in the respective legal order (Wiesmann 2004, 40) .
The construction of the full meaning of a legal term, the constitution of an extensive frame of legal knowledge including both intertextual relations to-and likewise interrelated with-norm texts, jurisprudence, and academic writings, as well as (and primarily) relations to the concrete everyday reality, is one of the major obstacles of the (future) legal translator. In contrast, while the legal layperson defines terms on the basis of a common understanding, the lexical and textual comprehension of the legal expert is driven, firstly, by those structured frames of legal knowledge and, secondly, on a second and implicit level, by referring the legal context to the extralinguistic world. ). In addition to that, the legal expert has the required procedural and metatextual knowledge to build these intertextual relations, to find the sources of law, and to bridge the gap between the abstract and the concrete (and vice versa).
These stages of conceptualization and delineation have to be executed by the legal translator-to a lesser extent with regard to legal interpretation but to a greater extent regarding the rendering of the legal meaning in the target text.
Concluding remarks
This article has shown a different view on the difficulties of legal translation and on the individual cognitive processes involved in legal text comprehension) were presented in the first section. In the second section these general models were applied to the special issues of the institutionalized legal communication and, namely, to the cognitive challenges a translator has to face in order to understand an expert utterance in all its legal, legal-linguistic, and factual dimensions.
Most of the issues could only be outlined here. In particular, it hasn't been possible to take into account research on the bilingual mental lexicon (see, e.g., Kroll and Stewart 1994; Ameel et al. 2009) The methodological and thematic propositions range from a holistic methodological approach to legal translation training, proposed by Prieto Ramos (2014c), to special focuses like the use of tools and resources (Wiesmann 2007) , translating in multilingual legal orders (Dullion 2014) , hermeneutic understanding in legal translation (Simonnaes 2012) , and the combination of legal translation and comparative law (Dullion 2015; Engberg 2013) , to mention just a few.
As teaching experience in legal translation training classes shows, very often students are not able to infer, from the text to be translated, the legal Cornu (2005, 209) , for the nonexpert, the high degree of abstraction is one of the most visible and, at the same time, one of the most blinding features of legal discourse. In this regard, the theoretical model presented here should be considered as a supplementary approach to tackling the difficulties of legal translation learners from a cognitive perspective. It can contribute to the generation of new teaching concepts for legal translation training, focusing more on the frame of reference of the legal expert, who shifts his gaze back and forth between the institutionalized legal text and the everyday reality. Engberg (2009b; 2012) discusses the relation between common or collective knowledge and meaning and individual construction of meaning from the perspective of (legal) linguistic semantics. In contrast, the theoretical model presented in this article is based on the assumption that a common meaning agreed upon at a collective level is a prerequisite for the construction of meaning on an individual level.
